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I. INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE DEBATE
While the battle as to the appropriate role of the judiciary in a
constitutional democracy has been taken up only relatively recently in
Irish legal history, it has been ongoing virtually since the foundation of
the United States of America.1 Central to the debate is the doctrine of
* B.A., J.D., Attorney at Law. Lecturer & Director of Clinical Legal Education,
Faculty of Law, National University of Ireland, Galway.
1. Paul Twomey, Bork's Originalism: Reconciling Judicial Constitutional
Interpretation with the Rule of Law, (1996) 14 I.L.T. 278, 278.
separation of power, first and most prominently annunciated by the
French philosopher Montesquieu.2 In a nutshell, that doctrine provides
that there are three separate branches of government: the executive; the
legislative; and the judicial. Each branch has its own distinct ambits and
functions. To the extent possible, therefore, these branches should not
intertwine, but remain separate. Both the Irish and American constitutions,
in their own way, are predicated on the separation of powers.3 However,
profound differences exist in the text of the two documents in this
regard, especially with respect to the role of the judicial branch.4
In the twentieth century, and particularly in the wake of multiple
controversial decisions by the United States Supreme Court under then
Chief Justice Earl Warren, a great deal of criticism was hurled at the
federal judiciary.5 The bulk, though not all, of that criticism was levied
by conservative politicians, academics, and interest groups. These groups
disagreed with the current jurisprudence, charging that the courts were
encroaching upon territory expressly reserved for the democratically
elected federal and state legislatures in violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. For those who, to the contrary, agreed with this course of
jurisprudence, these critics devised the label of "judicial activist," which
to this day is used to describe judges who would exceed their constitutional
mandate. The debate further intensified in later years when the federal
courts made a series of controversial decisions on issues like contraception,
7
forced busing,8 and abortion.9 More recently, in 2006, the Court reversed its
prior holding and ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute convicted
criminals under 18 years of age.' 0 Today, the national disagreement as to
the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy continues to rage as
President George W. Bush recently appointed two Justices to the Court.
2. See generally CHARLES Louis DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, DE
L'ESPRIT DES LoIx-BOOK XI (1748).
3. DAVID GWYNN MORGAN, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE IRISH
CONSTrrUTION 5-7 (1997). See also Sinnott v. Minister for Education, [2001] 2 I.R. 545,
710 (Ir.) (briefly discussing the separation of powers doctrine in the Irish and American
contexts).
4. See infra Sections II, III and IV.
5. Vincent Martin Bonventre, Judicial Activism, Judges' Speech, and Merit
Selection: Conventional Wisdom and Nonsense, 68 ALB. L. REv. 557, 566 (2005). See
also John Yoo, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Califomia-Berkley, February
1997, Testimony before the American Bar Association (transcript available at: http://www.
law.berkeley.edu/faculty/yooj/professional/writings/aba.html) (noting that Chief Justice
Earl Warren was among the most criticized federal judges in American history) (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007).
6. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 346-84 (7th ed. 1998) (1962).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1974).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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Likewise, in Ireland, the same debate was perhaps most prominently
joined in the wake of developments across the Atlantic when the
Supreme Court declared that there was a right to marital privacy in its
decision in McGee. 1 The dispute between those who advocate judicial
restraint, favouring an absolutist view of the separation of powers
doctrine, and those who view judicial intervention as a perhaps
undesirable, but undoubtedly necessary, evil continues presently both in
the case law of the Supreme Court and in related academic commentary.
The recent Sinnott12 and T.D. 13 cases are two prominent examples of this
constitutional quandary. 1
4
The tension inherent in all constitutional democracies is hardly news
to any legal observer. But this essay, as portended by its title, proffers
an argument that may appear radical in its scope and then ponders the
ramifications, if any, thereof on Irish constitutionalism.15 If one is to
adhere strictly to the express language of the United States Constitution
-that is, to read the document the way a critic of judicial activism
would say that it must be read-the federal judiciary might not truly be a
"co-equal partner" in government. 16 The converse is true in Ireland.' 7
As such, the case against an "activist judiciary" can be made much more
persuasively in the United States, than it can in Ireland. Moreover,
cautious judicial restraint and strict fidelity to the separation of powers
11. McGee v. Attorney General, [1974] I.R. 284 (Ir.). Cf Griswold, 381 U.S. at
479 (McGee v. Attorney General serves as an Irish equivalent of Griswold).
12. Sinnott v. Minister for Education, [2001] 2 I.R. 545, 545 (Ir.). Here, the
Supreme Court ruled that the government was not obliged to expend money on the
provision of primary education after the age of 18. It overturned a lower court decision
finding that the executive branch had acted unconstitutionally in refusing to continue
expending money for the education of the plaintiff, a 23 year old autistic man, and
ordering it to do so. Id.
13. See T.D. v. Minister for Education, [2001] 4 I.R. 259 (Ir.) (where the Supreme
Court overturned a lower court decision ordering the executive branch to expend money
on the provision of special facilities for children with special needs. The decision was
based largely on the separation of powers doctrine).
14. Because this is an essay about constitutionalism writ large, its body proper
won't delve into the facts of any cases referenced herein.
15. Gerry Whyte, The Legitimacy of Judicial Activism on behalf ofthe Disadvantaged,
in SOCIAL INCLUSION AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN IRELAND 15
(2002) ("Debate in the US about methods of constitutional interpretation forms an
important backdrop to Irish academic commentary on the issue.").
16. Theodore B. Olsen, Remembering Marbury v. Madison, 7 GREEN BAG 35, 35-
36 (2003) (President George W. Bush's former solicitor general describing the legacy of
Marbury).
17. It will also be referred to in Irish as Bunreacht na hEireann.
doctrine, while mandated by the United States Constitution, is suggested,
but certainly not required, by the Irish Constitution. 8
In support of this argument, this essay first examines the language of
Article III of the United States Constitution and then briefly reviews the
origins of the widely held perception that the federal judiciary is a
"co-equal" branch of government. 19 It next considers "Borkian
constitutionalism," opining that if one is to read the Constitution as
Bork urges, this essay's tentative proposition can't be far off the mark.
The focus then shifts to the express language of the Irish Constitution,
which accords a far greater responsibility to the judiciary than its
American counterpart. In this context, it reviews some pronouncements
in the recent case law of the Irish Supreme Court, notable for language
that might alternatively be described as "Borkian," "Scalian," or "originalism"
in nature, and the academic commentary that has emerged in its wake.
This essay posits that the originalism judicial philosophy lacks the merit
in Ireland that it rightly claims across the Atlantic and concludes by
pondering the implications for the vindication of socio-economic rights
in the Irish courts, given this philosophy's seemingly inexorable
ascendancy.
II. ARTICLE III RE-EXAMINED
Strangely enough, partisans on both sides of the debate as to the
appropriate role of the American federal judiciary seem to rarely, if ever,
look to its enabling legislation, Article III of the United States
Constitution. The language in Article III, set forth below in its entirety,
is concise and unambiguous.
Article III
Section 1
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
Section 2
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
18. See infra Sections II, III, and IV.
19. Olsen, supra note 16, at 35-36.
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of
another State;-between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Section 3
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no
Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except
during the Life of the Person attainted.
20
The relative brevity of entire Article III is immediately apparent upon
a review of the other Articles-I and II-prescribing the nature and
scope of power to be accorded the legislative and executive branches
respectively. In fact, there are 2,268 words devoted in Article I to the
powers of the legislature and 1,023 words are used to detail the powers
of the executive in Article II, but Article III is comprised of only 375,
and 80 of those describe the offence of treason.2 ' Only 295 words are
allocated the judiciary. The first sentence of Article III makes it clear
that there is only one "constitutional" court, the United States Supreme
Court, and that all other inferior federal courts are to be created
legislatively, by the Congress.2  Furthermore, as is described in Section
2, the Congress has total control of the Supreme Court's appellate
20. U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
21. U.S. CONST. arts. I, I, Ill.
22. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
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jurisdiction.23 Constitutionally, then, the Congress possesses the authority
both to eliminate every federal court in the United States tomorrow, if it
so chooses, and, on the very same day, to eliminate the appellate
jurisdiction, in its entirety, of the Supreme Court. Were Congress to
embark on this admittedly radical course of action, the nation's highest
court would be restricted to hearing those categories of cases over which
it is allocated original jurisdiction and the "law of the United States"
would resemble a patchwork quilt of precedents established by the
highest courts of each of the 50 states. While, as one current Supreme
Court Justice observes, this course of action would precipitate "chaos,"
some fanciful lawyering and judging would be required to convince even
a newly emasculated Court that doing so is prohibited by the Constitution.24
What then is the source of the oft-repeated maxim that the government
of the United States is composed of "three, co-equal branches?" And
even if there is a historical wellspring or theoretical framework for the
proposition of equality among the branches, doesn't the crystal clear and
very circumscribed language of Article III render the maxim a fallacy?
The traditional answer to the former question is that the principle of
inter-branch equality derives from the Supreme Court's 1805 decision in
Marbury v. Madison. That case is commonly, albeit incorrectly, regarded
as the source of the power of judicial review, i.e., that the Court has the
authority to strike down unconstitutional legislative acts.26 The Court
has said subsequently that Marbury represented "the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution., 27 And most recently, the Court has boldly reaffirmed the
principle emanating from Marbury that "it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."'28 Hence, so
goes the argument, and the judiciary is the arbiter of the constitutionality
of the acts of the legislative and executive branches, a "check" on the
awesome powers allocated to each, and thus an entirely independent, but
co-equal, branch of government.
The truth of the matter, however, is that the notion that the Court had
the authority to review the actions of the other branches in light of the
structures of the Constitution predates Marbury in American constitutional
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24. Comment of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in February
2005 visit to the Faculty of Law, National University of Ireland, Galway.
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
26. Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 401, 403
(2005).
27. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
28. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (2000).
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jurisprudence.29 Indeed, "[s]uch a power and duty was contemplated by
the Framers of the Constitution, publicly defended in Alexander Hamilton's
brilliant Federalist No. 78 (as well as other ratification debates), and
well-recognized in the courts of many states for years prior to Marbury."
30
The Framers' recognition of the Court's authority to judicially review
the actions of the other branches, however, in no way encompassed a
belief in judicial supremacy in matters of interpretation. 31 In fact, the
Framers painstakingly argued to the contrary in the debates over ratification.3 2
What's more, the paucity and limiting nature of the language of Article
III militate against judicial supremacy in any arena. Even co-equality
does not spring from the writings of the Framers and it certainly cannot
reasonably be derived from the constitutional text. Yet this principle of
supremacy has been espoused by the Supreme Court throughout the last
century under the stewardship of Chief Justices as far to the left as Earl
Warren and as far to the right as William Rehnquist. It is largely to
discussing the supremacy of the judiciary in matters of constitutional
interpretation that Professor, Judge, and former Supreme Court Justice
nominee, Robert Bork has devoted a career in academia and on the
federal bench. He argues persuasively that the unintended consequence
of the Framers' design has been the intrusion of the judiciary into that
intended to be the reserve of the legislature: lawmaking. His seminal
work on the role of the judiciary in a democracy provides the analytical
prism for advancing the claim tentatively made in this essay's title.
33
This claim--even if not wholly accepted-and the constitutional
distinctions highlighted in its making render explicit or implicit reliance
on American constitutional jurisprudence by Irish courts largely misplaced.
III. BORKIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
In The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law,
Judge Bork opines that the federal judiciary has fallen victim to a
temptation to begin ruling where the legislature should.34 He argues
29. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2706, 2707 (2003).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2708.
32. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After
Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1349-51 (1999).
33. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
34. Id. at 1.
that this runs contrary to the constitutional framework, especially the
separation of powers doctrine which it so prominently enshrines. This
has led to a series of unacceptable consequences, including the notion
among Americans that the Supreme Court is a political, rather than legal
forum. For Bork, the ongoing battle over the divisive and polarizing
issue of abortion crystallizes this reality. 35 Bork rather neatly synopsizes
his philosophy in the Introduction to that tour de force of American
constitutional jurisprudence. There, he stresses the point that, despite the
seemingly incoherent protestations of some legal academics who regard
the Constitution as a rather nebulous framework of principles from
which legislators and, yes, courts are to make policy, the Constitution is
ultimately law and its "principles are known and control judges. 36
Those who would contest this understanding are "ultra liberal activists"
who "see the Constitution as a weapon in a class struggle about social
and political values. 37 The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade is the
epitome of their aim.
38
In support of his own view, however, Bork discusses the genius of the
constitutional design, language distinctly enshrining the separation of
powers doctrine being its paramount virtue. Because that language is
law, Bork argues that judges are bound by it and must be extremely
careful not to encroach on that which falls within the ambit of the
executive and/or legislative branches. The judges' "great office" is the
preservation of the constitutional design he is so enamored of.39 Bork
suggests that the Constitution speaks directly to that reality.
Federal judges, alone among our public officials, are given life tenure precisely
so that they will not be held accountable to the people. If it were otherwise, if
judges were accountable, the people could, when the mood seized them, alter
the separation of powers, do away with representative government, or deny
basic freedoms to those out of popular favor. But if judges are, as they must be
to perform their vital role, unelected, unaccountable, and unrepresentative, who
is to protect us from the power of judges? How are we to be guarded from our
guardians? The answer can only be that judges must consider themselves bound
by law that is independent of their own views of the desirable. They must not
make or apply any policy not fairly to be found in the Constitution or a
statute.
40
It is here where Bork, like most all other observers, seems to overlook
the aforementioned reality of the text of Article III. When Bork mentions
federal judges, to whom is he referring? In a modem context, it appears
35. Id. at 3-4.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 8, 10.
38. Id
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 5.
466
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logical that he means all those men and women who sit on the federal
district courts, circuit courts of appeal and Supreme Court. However,
Article III references only a Supreme Court, whose appellate jurisdiction
is to be determined exclusively by the Congress, and "other [inferior]
courts" that Congress may create or eliminate at its discretion. Isn't that
clear subjugation to the will of the legislature the real limitation on
the judiciary, not the more abstract notion of a grand design? A "loose"
constructionist, who views the Constitution as a set of guiding principles,
rather than a binding legal document, can articulate a strong response to
that question. But those who, like Bork, believe that the Constitution is
law cannot. The express language of Article III makes it manifest that
the Framers did not intend for the judiciary to be supreme in any area
and that may be the real buttress for the philosophy of judicial restraint
and strict fidelity to the separation of powers doctrine that Bork and
others advocate. Specifically, in the passage above, Bork argues that the
Constitution provides that judges are allowed to discharge the duties of
their position without the possibility of being held to account. This
ignores the language-the law-in Article III that the Congress has
plenary regulatory control over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
as well as the power to create and, logically, the corollary power to
abolish lower federal courts as it sees fit. Doesn't this reality render the
judiciary ultimately accountable to the Congress? If the Congress doesn't
like the way the Supreme Court handles a particular area of law, it is
constitutionally permitted to forbid the court from hearing related
appeals. If Congress wants to establish federal courts to hear strictly
commercial cases, and remove them from the purview of the existing
district courts, it is free to do so. If it doesn't like a particular district
court, it can eliminate it tomorrow under the Constitution. Again, a "loose"
constructionist can argue against all of this, but someone who regards
the Constitution as law cannot. Even allowing for Marbury and judicial
review, these hypothetical and highly unlikely congressional courses of
action are expressly permitted by the law of the Constitution.
At any rate, whether or not one concurs with the seemingly radical
idea mooted in the foregoing discussion of American constitutionalism,
it must be recognized that the intellectual coherence of Bork's crusade
against "judicial activism" is derived directly from the constitutional
framework in which he operates. Contesting the proposition that the
United States Constitution allocates a limited role to the judiciary is
extremely difficult. And that's why the argument for restraint and against
activism has merit in an American context. It is to a consideration of the
currency of this school of thought in the Irish constitutional framework
that this essay now turns.
IV. IRISH CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
While there are undeniable similarities in many respects between the
American and Irish constitutions, there are fundamental differences as
well. 41 The distinctions are perhaps most pronounced in those sections
of the Irish Constitution dealing with the judiciary. The powers delineated
therein are concrete, detailed and comprise 1,132 words of text, as
opposed to the 295 allocated to the judiciary in Article III of the United
States Constitution. Article 34 provides, inter alia, that there shall be a
"Court of Final Appeal" (i.e., Supreme Court), "Courts of First Instance,"
including "Courts of local and limited jurisdiction," and, tellingly, a
"High Court," whose jurisdiction "shall extend to the question of the
validity of any law having regard to the provisions of the Constitution.,A
2
While that article, similar to its corollary in the United States Constitution,
then states that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction may be
subject to regulation, it follows with the proviso that "no law shall be
enacted excepting from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
cases which involve questions as to the validity of any law having regard
to the provisions of this Constitution. ' '43 Article 35 states that "all judges
shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial functions and
subject only to this Constitution and the law."4 And Article 37 contains
the principle that nothing in the Irish Constitution "shall operate to
invalidate the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial
41. T.D. v. Minister for Education, [2001] 4 I.R. at 310-312 (Denham, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the drafters of the 1937 Irish Constitution took a "similar"
approach to the Framers of the American Constitution, but also posits that "the
Constitution established the special duty of the courts to protect fundamental rights and
the Constitution." No such duty is found in Article III of the United States Constitution.). See
also Gerard Casey, Are There Unenumerated Rights in the Irish Constitution?, 23 I.L.T.
123, 126 (2005) describing the United States Constitution's "role for much that is found
in Bunreacht na hEireann"). A further difference not alluded to directly in this essay is
the process by which the two documents are amended. A mere majority vote in a
popular referendum is sufficient to amend the Irish Constitution. See Gerry Whyte,
Natural Law and the Constitution, 14 I.L.T. 8, 9 (1996) noting that "decisions of the
Supreme Court on the interpretation of the Constitution could, with relative ease, be
amended by way of referendum"). In the United States, however, amending the Constitution
is a Herculean task. A proposed constitutional amendment must be approved by a 2/3
majority in both houses and then ratified by majority vote in 3/4 of the 50 state
legislatures.
42. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 34.
43. IR. CONST., 1937, arts. 34.4.3, 34.4.4.
44. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 35.2.
[VOL. 8: 459, 2007] Irish Debate on 'Judicial Activism'
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
nature. 4 5 The myriad differences between these Articles and Article III
of the United States Constitution-all indicative of the significantly
higher degree of power expressly allocated the Irish judiciary from the
bottom up by the language of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish language
title of the Constitution of Ireland)-have dramatic implications for the
judicial role and vitiate against the "Borkian" arguments for restraint
presently espoused by a majority of the Irish Supreme Court.
The argument for restraint features prominently in Supreme Court
Justice Adrian Hardiman's opinion in TD. Near the outset of his opinion,
Hardiman asks and answers a rhetorical question:
If a judge considers that there has been a "failure of the legislature and
executive" (to use a phrase of the learned trial judge in this case) in some
particular area of constitutionally significant policy, can he or she on that
account "attempt to fill the vacuum" by ordering either of those bodies to
implement a particular policy? If this is possible, it may gratify those who
agree with the judge that there has been a failure, and who find the solution
which he or she imposes acceptable. But it would represent an enormous
increase in the power of an unelected judiciary at the expense of the politically
accountable branches of government.
47
And later in T.D., before citing with approval a passage from United
States Supreme Court Justice Byron White's majority opinion in Bowers
v. Hardwick,48 Hardiman states "[i]n my view, the courts in their own
interest and for the protection of their legitimacy in the discharge of their
proper role, should be reluctant even to appear to trespass on the spheres
of the political organs of government."" 9 Given the constitutional authority
accorded to Irish courts, what is the legal basis for and how legitimate is
this reluctance that Judge Bork and Justice Scalia would praise? In
addition to a philosophical reverence for Montesquieu's doctrine that
features in both Sinnott and T.D., much of the legal authority for
Hardiman's view seems to come from across the Atlantic.
The cited passage from Bowers notes that the "[c]ourt is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-
45. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 37.
46. T.D. v. Minister for Education, [2001] 4 I.R. 259, 338 (Ir.).
47. Id. at 339. See also Sinnott v. Minister for Education, [2001] 2 I.R. 545, 710-
12 (Ir.) (featuring a similar discussion of the separation of powers doctrine that reads just
like one of Justice Scalia's thunderous dissents).
48. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of
an anti-sodomy statute). The Court has since overruled itself, striking down a similar
statute as unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
49. TD.. 4 I.R. at 361-62.
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution" and that the judiciary must
avoid assuming "further authority to govern the country without
express constitutional authority. 5° In an article published subsequent to
the Court's decisions in T.D. and Sinnott, Hardiman argues that the last
point in Justice White's opinion is the perfect antidote to much American
20th century constitutional jurisprudence which, unlike Ireland's, is
comprised of numerous political decisions. 51 He further opines that
judges must respect their judicial role and that, to the extent they decline
to do so, they step beyond their designated, non-political duty. In
articulating his position at a macro-level, Hardiman again looks to the
United States and defines an opinion by Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes as the "most famous judicial dissent against politically
encroaching decision making.,
52
It is not argued here, nor could it plausibly be, that Hardiman's (or
like-minded members of the Irish judiciary) arguments are wholly
without merit. No rational observer would claim that a judge should
give into temptation and "rule where a legislator should"53 or that the
political process should be preserved as nothing more than "an inferior
organ of government., 54 In constitutional democracies, like Ireland and
the United States, democratically accountable representatives of the
people, not a largely unrepresentative and unaccountable judiciary, should
be in the business of lawmaking. What is argued is that the respect for
"the separation of powers and the restraint that doctrine imposes on each
organ of Government" 55 is far more deeply entrenched and much more
unequivocally pronounced in the United States Constitution than in
Bunreacht na hEireann. Consequently, and in light of the aforementioned
language of Article III of the former document, the passages cited
approvingly by Hardiman from Bowers and Lochner can't be looked at
in a vacuum and their import in an Irish context can be quite easily
misperceived. To concretize this point again, one of the real politik
factors lurking in the background of the Court's decision in Bowers (and
in many others) is that a conservative United States Congress, angered
by a decision to strike down a statute outlawing sodomy, could the very
next day have voted to remove all related cases from the Court's
50. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
51. Adrian Hardiman, The Role of the Supreme Court in Our Democracy, in
POLITICAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM IN IRELAND 39, 39-40 (Joe Mulholland
ed., 2004).
52. Id. at 41 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. BORK, supra note 33, at 1.
54. Hardiman, supra note 50, at 42.
55. Id. at41.
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appellate jurisdiction. Although this reality doesn't illuminate much of
the debate between "activists" and "strict constructionists," the seeming
-if not readily apparent-thrust of Article Ill's language is to limit the
workings of the federal judiciary. The aforementioned relevant provisions
of Bunreacht na hIireann provide for a great deal more judicial
independence than this. The constitutional remit of the Irish judiciary is
broader. Accordingly, their attempted reliance on American constitutional
jurisprudence for a theory that espouses hyper-fidelity to the separation
of powers doctrine and urges judicial restraint is misplaced. After all, in
any constitutional democracy, the functions of the three branches of
government "are themselves of constitutional origin and constitutionally
defined. 56 The weaknesses of this school of thought now prevalent in
the Irish judiciary, however, have been alluded to in a purely domestic
context as well.
For instance, Prof. Gerry Whyte writes that this school of thought
seems at odds with one key feature of the Irish Constitution that relates
more to its overarching spirit, as opposed to the letter of the language
employed to describe the judicial function. As he points out, "it is important
to note that the Irish Constitution, unlike its US counterpart, is not
simply concerned with establishing a system of government." 57 Whyte
persuasively argues that the hallmark of Bunreacht na hEireann-
embodied in its Preamble, which cites the virtues of "Prudence, Justice
and Charity," the "dignity and freedom of the individual" and the goal of
"true social order;" its commitment to protecting implied rights in
Article 40.3; its provision for the right to free education in Article 42.4;
and its mandate in Article 42.5 that the State care for abandoned
children-is a ringing endorsement of social inclusion as a central value
in the foundation of the State. 58 This aspiration for ensuring social
inclusion in Ireland is far more ideological than anything contained in
the United States Constitution, which is notable for being far more
concerned with the "process of government, not a governing ideology.,
59
The lofty principles contained in the Preamble to the Constitution and
the firm commitments spelled out in its body properly undermine an
56. Sinnott v. Minister for Education, [2001] 2 I.R. 545, 707 (Ir.). The two
documents define the functions of the respective judiciaries quite differently.
57. Gerry Whyte, Addendum, in SOCIAL INCLUSION AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM:
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN IRELAND 361 (Dublin 2002).
58. Id. at 361 n.74. See also IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl., arts. 40.3, 42.4 and 42.5.
59. JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100
(Cambridge 1980).
argument that it is almost always inappropriate for the judiciary to
intervene when action or inaction by the other two branches proves an
obstacle to, and not a conduit of, social inclusion.
Moreover, in her dissent in T.D., Justice Susan Denham, while paying
due respect to those provisions of the Constitution that delineate the
various duties of the three branches of government 6° and vest sole
lawmaking authority in the Oireachtas,61 makes the following prescient
observation that likewise militates against Hardiman et al's philosophy:
Fundamental powers of government are distributed between these three great
organs [i.e., the executive, legislative and judicial] of State. A separation of
powers is described although it is not a strict division or distribution of power.
It is not a doctrine applied rigidly in the Constitution. A framework for
government is established which includes a functional separation of powers to
independent organs of State. It is the separation and independence of the
institutions which is important. However, checks and balances are created
between the three organs of State, for example the power given to the superior
courts to review legislation, and the power given to the Government to appoint
judges and to Dail Eireann and Seanad Eireann to remove a judge.
62
Stressing the import of checks and balances, Denham later observes
that where the government acts in contravention of its powers and duties
under the Constitution, the Court has a duty to intervene because of its
"power and obligation to protect constitutional rights. '63 Again, this duty,
unlike the duty assumed by the United States Supreme Court, is found
within the express language of the text of Bunreacht na htireann. 64 It is
perhaps the judiciary's manner of intervention which has caused the
most consternation for Hardiman and others. Ordinarily, where the Court
finds that another branch has acted unconstitutionally, it will issue a
declaratory order to that effect.65 However, in "truly exceptional" cases,
similar to a writ of mandamus, the Court may issue mandatory orders
ordering another branch to take action and/or expend moneys to rectify a
constitutional wrong.66
Clearly, cogent arguments can be made that the judiciary, by involving
itself to this extent in the functioning of the other branches, violates the
separation of powers doctrine and transgresses its constitutional mandate.
60. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 6.1.
61. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 15.2.1. The Oireachtas is the collective term for the two
houses of the Irish Parliament, the Dail and the Seanad.
62. T.D. v. Minister for Education, [2001] 4 I.R. 259, 289-99 (Ir.).
63. Id. at 301.
64. Genevieve Coonan, The Role of Judicial Research Assistants in Supporting the
Decision-Making Role of the Irish Judiciary, 6(1) JUD. STUD. INST. J. 171, 190 (2006)
(noting that judicial review has been invoked in American constitutional jurisprudence
since Marbury, but that, in Ireland, "the courts' jurisdiction to engage in this striking
practice is found in the Constitution itself').
65. Id. at 303.
66. Id.
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Indeed, the former Chief Justice has argued that a judiciary's doing so
would precipitate problems in virtually all liberal democracies, and to an
even greater extent in an Irish context, given his strong view that the
Constitution was designed so that socio-economic rights are to be
enforced by the legislature, not by the judiciary.67 Furthermore, he notes
that:
[W]here a declaration [has been] made that the legislature or [the] executive
have failed to uphold a particular constitutional right of the citizen, the courts
are entitled to assume that their decision to that effect will be treated with the
appropriate degree of respect by the other organs of [the] State. It is quite
another matter, however, for the court to assume the roles specifically assigned
under the constitution to the legislature and the executive.
68
Summing up this argument, he endorses Hardiman's emphatic statement
in Sinnott to the effect that the judiciary must not involve itself in the
business of the other branches. But on the other hand, if the judiciary
declines to issue mandatory orders in truly exceptional cases, does it
become something of a "toothless tiger?"70 These responses to and defense
of Hardiman's philosophy are raised for illustrative purposes only.
Resolution of the debate as to the propriety of issuing mandatory orders
lies beyond the scope of this essay. Yet provided their issuance is confined
to this category of "truly exceptional" cases, a phrase which has been
quite narrowly construed, it would seem that the Irish judiciary has the
constitutional authority, though perhaps not a constitutional mandate, to
do So.
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67. Ronan Keane, Judges as Lawmakers: The Irish Experience, 4(2) JUD. STUD.
INST. J. 1, 15-16 (2004) (discussing the Directive Principles of Social Policy in Article
45).
68. Id. at 16-17.
69. Id. at 17 (quoting Sinnott v. Minister for Education, [2001] 2 I.R. 545, 711
(Ir.)).
70. Fergus W. Ryan, Disability and the Right to Education. Defining the
Constitutional 'Child,' 24 DUBLIN U. L. J. 96, 105 (2002) (positing that there are
exceptional cases that demand "more than an assertion of the State's wrongdoings). See
also Shivaun Quinlivan & Mary Keys, Official Indifference and Persistent Procrastination:
An Analysis of Sinnott, 2(2) JuD. STUD. INST. J. 163, 183(2002) (arguing that the judiciary's
reluctance to grant mandatory orders is strongest when asked to enforce socio-economic
rights).
71. T.D. v. Minister for Education, [2001] 4 I.R. 259, 337 (Ir.). Justice Murray,
now Chief Justice, argues that it first must be established that there has been "a conscious and
deliberate decision by the organ of the state to act in breach of its constitutional
obligation to other parties, accompanied by bad faith or recklessness" and that "the
absence of good faith or the reckless disregard of rights would impinge on the
V. CONCLUSION
This essay has doubtless provoked more constitutional questions than
it ever endeavored to answer. What, it is hoped, is clear is that the Irish
judiciary's reliance, whether explicit or implicit, on the constitutional
jurisprudence of the United States for a judicial philosophy that emphasizes
restraint and unquestioning loyalty to the separation of powers doctrine
is inappropriate. To a large extent, the myriad differences between
Article III of the United States Constitution and the relevant provisions
of Bunreacht na hEireann render this a case of "apples and oranges." In
the interest of clarity, judicial adherents to this philosophy in Ireland
should ground their arguments elsewhere, either in domestic law (Article
4572 is one potential source) or in the constitutional jurisprudence of
another jurisdiction whose judiciary is similarly empowered. There is
much fertile territory outside of Washington, DC on which to base a
conservative judicial philosophy. Regardless, because its adherents are
unlikely to change their minds in the foreseeable future, those now
seeking to vindicate socio-economic rights through the judicial process
are likely to be told that their remedy lies not in the Four Courts, but in
Leinster House.73
And perhaps that is the way it should be. Perhaps the best way to
proceed is for individuals to lobby, cajole, and convince legislators into
making laws that will better their condition. One criticism of this
proposition, however, is that it rests on the premise "that individuals are
on equal footing and can fend for themselves without the assistance of
government." 74 This criticism is particularly valid in that today, "the
most marginalized in Irish society.. . believe they have no real say,
distrust the State and politicians, and are skeptical about how much the
process contributes. ' 75 This is far from an ideal world. The success of
those now aggrieved in the rough and tumble world of electoral politics,
therefore, would seem dependent upon a cultural, social and attitudinal
metamorphosis on the Emerald Isle the likes of which are heretofore
unseen.
observance by the State party concerned of any declaratory order made by the court"
before a mandatory order can justly be issued by the judiciary. Id.
72. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 45 (providing, inter alia, that "principles of social
policy... intended for the general guidance of the Oireachtas... shall be the care of the
Oireachtas exclusively.., and shall not be cognisable by any Court under any of the
provisions of this Constitution").
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